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I. ABSTRACT 
Drawing upon the theoretical concepts of reputation and social networking, 
this article’s main objective is to assess how investment banks choose external law 
firms.  Using qualitative methods, I show that investment banks, to varying 
degrees, rely on internal counsel, procurement specialists, and boards of directors 
to decide which firm to select.  When choosing a specific law firm for the first 
time, corporate decision-makers are likely to evaluate law firms based on 
intangible factors like reputation and the word-of-mouth referrals of their 
colleagues.  In subsequent selections of a law firm, these factors are transplanted 
by past results.  Firm expertise and cost considerations impact procurement 
decisions regardless of whether a law firm has been previously retained.  Despite 
claiming that the individual lawyers providing the service is a more important 
selection criterion than the firm that employs those lawyers, investment banks 
seem to experience a degree of embeddedness that keeps them using the same 
firms time after time. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Around the world and throughout history, lawyers and investment bankers 
conjure images of wealth, influence, and success.  In Elizabethan England, 
William Shakespeare wrote of Portia, an elegant and beautiful heiress who 
disguised herself as a young (and male) lawyer in The Merchant of Venice, and 
centuries later, Agatha Christie bequeathed to the literary world Sir Wilfred 
Robarts, a seasoned barrister, in Witness for the Prosecution.  In the United States, 
public renown for the two industries extends from the early days of the republic.  
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Of the fifty-six signatories of the Declaration of Independence, eighteen were 
bankers or merchants, and thirty-five were lawyers or judges.  Hollywood has 
further tattooed perceptions of lawyers and bankers on the human psyche—the 
tireless Jan Schlichtmann seeking restitution against corporate juggernauts in A 
Civil Action, Patrick Bateman living the life of a self-obsessed profligate in 
American Psycho, and perhaps most famously, Gordon Gekko demonstrating a 
twisted variation of the American Dream in Wall Street.  These examples are 
presented not to glorify or denigrate the banking and legal professions, but rather 
to illustrate the unique, historical, and indispensable roles the two industries have 
played in corporate culture.   
Incontrovertibly, a great degree of interaction exists between law firms and 
investment banks, with the latter organizations relying on the former for legal 
advice on mergers, acquisitions, and complex transactions, as well as for guidance 
when wading in the pool of varying international regulations.  At some level within 
the hierarchy of an investment bank, an official makes a decision to seek external 
counsel.  That choice is at the crux of this paper. 
Drawing upon the theoretical concepts of reputation and social networking, 
this article’s main objective is to assess how investment banks choose external law 
firms.  Specifically, this article posits that firm reputation, social networks, and the 
media will be more important factors in the initial selection of a law firm than in 
subsequent selections, which will rely more heavily on criteria like service 
satisfaction, social ties, embeddedness, and price. 
The relationship between an investment bank and an external law firm is best 
characterized as one between professional service firms.  Contemporary theory on 
the selection of professional service firms is in its infancy.  Heretofore, research 
has focused on client satisfaction and the purchasing decisions made by 
individuals.  Studies centered on investment banks and law firms, as well as the 
interactions between these two niches within the professional service firm 
classification, are relatively nonexistent.  Generally, researchers have limited their 
studies of the factors motivating choice to either the initial selection of a firm or to 
those influencing retention and defection.  This article makes an effort to advance 
present theory and suggest areas for further exploration.  Its novelty lies in the fact 
that selection is carried out by a firm, as opposed to an individual.  Furthermore, 
the end result of that selection sees one professional service firm choosing another 
to provide a specialized service.   
Each section of this article strives to fulfill a particular objective.  
Culminating with a set of research expectations and implications, Section III 
presents a comprehensive survey of present academic theory on reputation, social 
networks, selection criteria, and retention/defection.  This thorough treatment of 
the academic literature allows for an easier understanding of the research methods 
(outlined in Section IV) utilized to obtain data.  Section V examines the collected 
data, and Section VI discusses how research results met, or differed from, project 
expectations and contemporary theory, offering commentary on the long-term 
implications of the gathered data.  The article concludes by disclosing the 
difficulties encountered throughout the project and suggesting topics for future 
examination.   
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III. THEORY 
This section provides a thorough analysis of the compendium of theory 
related to the research goals.  Whilst ample research exists on professional service 
firms, it is mainly concerned with client satisfaction and quality assessment.  Very 
few studies have focused on how one professional service firm selects another 
professional service firm.  Fewer still have examined law firms and how they differ 
from other professional service firms.  Those studies that do exist concentrate on 
individual, as opposed to firm, purchasing decisions.  Because of the paucity of 
information directly related to law firms, this chapter presents a broad overview of 
the academic literature on social networks, reputation, embeddedness, and the 
influence of the media.  It is acknowledged that theories generated from the study 
of one professional firm—accounting, for example—may not be transferable to 
law firms.  However, the testing of these broad theories in the context of law firms 
is one of the overarching goals of this project. 
A. Professional Service Firms: An Overview of External Selection 
Professional service firms (“PSFs”) are “those whose primary assets are a 
highly educated (professional) workforce and whose outputs are intangible 
services encoded with complex knowledge.”1  Three characteristics further define 
PSFs: knowledge is their core resource, their clients are other firms, and the 
knowledge that PSFs produce is utilized by other businesses as part of their 
production processes.2  Both investment banks and law firms fall within this 
definition, and therefore, both qualify as PSFs. 
However, the focus of this paper is not on the services offered by investment 
banks to clients, which include advice on mergers, divestiture, and acquisitions; 
rather, this report is concerned with the legal departments of investment banks.  
Most investment banks have an in-house legal staff, but on certain occasions, they 
retain external counsel.  Corporate clients typically call upon their in-house 
lawyers to make this decision.3  Research by Day and Barksdale4 identified four 
considerations of corporate decision-makers when selecting a firm.  These factors 
were: “(1) perceived experience, expertise, and competence of the provider; (2) the 
provider’s understanding of the client’s needs and interests; (3) the provider’s 
relationship and communication skills; and (4) the likelihood of the provider 
conforming to contractual and administrative requirements.”5  Though Day and 
Barksdale’s study focused on the selection of architecture firms, similar factors 
                                                          
1 Royston Greenwood et al., Reputation, Diversification, and Organizational Performance in 
Professional Service Firms, 16 ORG. SCI. 661, 661 (2005).    
2 Lilach Nachum, Winners and Losers in Professional Services: What Makes the Difference? 
Empirical Evidence for the Advertising Industry, 16 SERVICE INDUSTRIES J. 474, 474 (1996).  
3 See Brian Uzzi et al., Your Client Relationships and Reputation: Weighing the Worth of Social 
Ties: Embeddedness and the Price of Legal Services in the Large Law Firm Market, in MANAGING THE 
MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW PERSPECTIVES 91, 100 (Laura Empson ed., 2007).  
4 See Ellen Day & Hiram C. Barksdale, Jr., How Firms Select Professional Services, 21 INDUS. 
MARKETING 85, 86 (1992).    
5 Id. 
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may be used by investment banks when choosing external legal services. 
Thus far, research on PSF selection and evaluation has focused on two 
distinct periods.  Some recent studies have examined the initial stages of firm-
client interaction— when a particular client is retaining a specific firm for the first 
time.6  This article refers to this initial firm retention as “nascent selection.”  Other 
researchers have concentrated on later stages of the firm-client relationship, 
examining clients’ decisions to reuse a PSF beyond the first interaction.7  I have 
termed these choices “subsequent selection.”  In essence, when retaining legal 
services, a client must make two decisions: whether to retain a law firm used in the 
past and (if the answer to the first question is to the negative) which new firm to 
select.  I feel it is necessary to distinguish between nascent and subsequent 
selections because, as academic literature suggests, corporate decision-makers 
assess the quality of a law firm and approach their choices in different ways 
depending on the stage of selection. 
B. Retaining an External Provider for the First Time 
Nascent selection refers to the retention of a law firm for the first time.  The 
professional service firm choosing external counsel faces a high level of 
uncertainty.  Most apparently, the PSF is devoid of firsthand knowledge about the 
law firm, and it also suffers from a more general disadvantage: the PSF is 
approaching external legal services precisely because it lacks the skills, manpower, 
or ability to handle a legal matter within the walls of its organization.8  Thus, the 
PSF may not have the tools to evaluate the abilities of law firms whose associates 
possess specialized knowledge and are highly educated.9  Corporate decision-
makers, for this reason, typically embrace an “intangible” criterion of assessment, 
that of law firm reputation. 
1. Reputation 
Fombrun and Shanley first took note of the importance of reputation in the 
retention of external providers for the first time.10  Greenwood, Li, Prakash, and 
Deephouse (“Greenwood et al.”) expanded on this idea, showing that reputation is 
especially important when clients are making purchasing decisions because it helps 
to allay the fears of clients who are uncertain about a choice of a professional 
service firm.11  Uzzi, Lancaster, and Dunlap (“Uzzi et al.”) confirmed this notion, 
demonstrating that in-house counsel typically choose firms higher in status when 
asked to select outside legal representation because they are more easily able to 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., Uzzi et al., supra note 3, at 114; Charles Fombrun & Mark Shanley, What’s in a Name? 
Reputation Building and Corporate Strategy, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 233 (1990).    
7 See, e.g., Dayananda Palihawadana & Bradley R. Barnes, Client Loyalty and Defection in the 
Corporate Legal Industry, 24 SERVICE INDUSTRIES J. 101 (2004); Day & Barksdale, supra note 4.   
8 See N.A. MORGAN, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES MARKETING (1991).  
9 See Greenwood et al., supra note 1. 
10 See Fombrun & Shanley, supra note 6, at 233.  
11 See Greenwood et al., supra note 1, at 663.  
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justify their decisions to superiors.12 
On the flipside of the attorney-client relationship, it is clear that law firms 
benefit from a positive reputation.  Uzzi et al. claimed that demarcations of status, 
like prestige and name recognition, influence pricing.13  Firms judged higher in 
status are able to charge more for their services and still remain profitable.14  Uzzi 
et al. attempted to quantify the concept of reputation by encompassing easily 
measured factors into their assessment.  Law firms are deemed higher in status if 
they are ranked higher by independent assessors and if they attract more graduates 
of top law schools (based on mainstream rankings like U.S. News and World 
Report).15  The board membership of partners also increases the status of a firm.  
Board seats allow law firms to access “inside” information and better market 
themselves to businesses by differentiating themselves from the competition.16  
Possession of these seats also affects the price of legal counsel.  Law firms having 
one or more partners serving on the board of directors of another corporation 
charge three times more for legal services.17   
The concept of “reputation” is difficult to define because it has distinct 
meanings for different people.  Deephouse holds reputation to be “the evaluation 
of a firm by its stakeholders in terms of their affect, esteem, and knowledge.”18  
Research has demonstrated that this relatively ambiguous concept influences 
corporate decision-making.19  Factors that help establish a firm’s reputation 
include how often a firm satisfies a stakeholder’s expectations and the profitability 
of the firm.20  “Perceptions of firms’ concern for wider society may influence 
judgments, with social responsiveness signaling that firms have achieved a 
mutualistic relationship with potentially powerful groups in their environments.”21  
Years of experience, specialty, personal qualities, recommendation, and 
geographical location have been found to be important characteristics in evaluating 
law firms.22  The presence or absence of these qualities influences a client’s 
perception of the quality of the legal services he is receiving.23  Clients also view 
                                                          
12 See Uzzi et al., supra note 3, at 115. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. at 109.  
17 See id.  
18 David L. Deephouse, Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: An Integration of Mass 
Communication and Resource-based Theories, 26 J. MGMT. 1091, 1093 (2000).  
19 See, e.g., Kenneth E. Clow et al., The Antecedents of Consumer Expectations of Services: An 
Empirical Study Across Four Industries, 11 J. SERVICES MARKETING 230, 240 (1997) (demonstrating 
that a firm’s reputation was correlated to consumer expectations and, consequently, to the purchasing 
decisions made by those same consumers).   
20 See id. at 232.  
21 Fombrun & Shanley, supra note 6, at 239.  
22 M.A. Hughes & J.J. Kasulis, The Production Cue Hypothesis and the Marketing of Legal 
Services, in SERVICES MARKETING IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 112 (Thomas M. Bloch et al. eds., 
1985).  
23 See F.G. Crane, Choice Criteria and Cue Usage in Selecting Lawyers, 5 J. PROF. SERVICES 
MARKETING 113 (1989).   
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larger law firms as “better” and “more prestigious.”24 
Interestingly, firm size and geographical location seem to be double-edged 
swords for law firms.  Spar points out that “global” law firms are among the 
highest ranked in terms of profits per partner.25  On the other hand, a number of 
potential clients are skeptical of these mega-firms, seeing them as the Wal-Marts 
of the legal world—massive bureaucratic structures that overshadow personal 
relationships with clients.26  Particularly in the nascent stage, when clients are 
dealing with such a high level of uncertainty, they might be more likely to retain a 
local firm perceiving it to be easier to contact and more personal.27 
Crane distinguished the criteria that clients consider important when 
choosing a law firm from the “cues” that indicate the fulfillment of those criteria.  
This paper has already expounded upon the traits that encompass a positive law 
firm reputation (recommendations and personal qualities, among others), but 
where does a potential client acquire information about the reputation of a specific 
law firm?  
2. Social Networks 
In situations where a corporate decision-maker does not possess the 
appropriate skills to assess the quality of legal services, he often relies upon 
information garnered through his social network.  This information comes in the 
form of word-of-mouth (“WOM”) referrals or recommendations.28  Presently, 
academic literature is focused on two components of WOM referrals: input and 
output.  Output WOM is best categorized as a characteristic of the post-service 
stage, and thus, this paper will reserve discussion of that topic until subsequent 
selection is analyzed.  WOM input refers to the solicitation of another individual’s 
(or firm’s) opinion about a certain service provider.  Conditions in which WOM 
input is especially important include times of high risk, greater complexity of 
evaluation, and situations where there is a gap in knowledge between the client and 
service provider.29   
While opinions dispensed by PSFs through their social networks impact a 
law firm’s stature, a law firm’s reputation is also predicated on information 
disseminated to the public at large.  This information can be classified into one of 
two categories.30  Private information is that which is “subjective” and “verifiable 
                                                          
24 Debora L. Spar, Lawyers Abroad: The Internationalization of Legal Practice, CAL. MGMT. REV. 
8 (Spring 1997).  
25 See id. at 18.  
26 See Barnaby J. Feder, The Unorthodox Behemoth of Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/14/business/the-unorthodox-behemoth-of-law-firMs.html 
?src=pm.  
27 See Vincent-Wayne Mitchell, Problems and Risks in the Purchasing of Consultancy Services, 14 
SERVICE INDUSTRIES J. 315, 326 (1994).  
28 See Karen Maru File & Russ Alan Prince, Positive Word-of-Mouth: Customer Satisfaction and 
Buyer Behavior, 10 INT’L J. BANK MARKETING 25 (1992).   
29 See Karen Maru File et al., Word-of-Mouth Effects in Professional Services Buyer Behavior, 14 
SERVICE INDUSTRIES J. 301, 303 (1994).  
30 See Uzzi et al., supra note 3, at 96.  
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by a third party.”31  In contrast, public information is readily available to the public 
and is put forth by third parties.32  Media portrayals are examples of public 
information that affect firm reputation. 
3. The Media 
Independent reports by the media include television news stories, newspaper 
coverage, and ranking lists of popular periodicals.  Suchman highlights the link 
between media coverage and reputation, stressing the enormous power the media 
wields in establishing a perception of legitimacy around a firm.33  In the public’s 
estimation, “legitimate organizations” are thought to be “more meaningful” and 
“more trustworthy.”34  For this reason, legitimate firms are accorded a type of 
“institutional capital” as a result of positive media coverage which, in turn, raises 
their worth in the minds of potential clients.35  The notion of “information 
cascades” best explains this process.  In selecting a professional service firm, a 
client faces a degree of uncertainty; that is, he may be unable to distinguish the 
merits of one firm over another.  To overcome his selection uncertainty, a client 
might embrace the viewpoint of an opinion leader—the media reporting on the 
firms.36 
Timothy Pollock37 and Violina Rindova38 point out three ways in which 
increased media coverage improves firm reputation.39  First, exposure and 
familiarity to a firm increases that firm’s favorability.40  Second, simple repetition 
of information leads to the belief that it is valid.41  Finally, the more information 
                                                          
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 See Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 571, 587 (1995).  
34 Id. at 575.  
35 See, e.g., Michael Lounsbury & Mary Ann Glynn, Cultural Entrepreneurship: Stories, 
Legitimacy, and the Acquisition of Resources, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 545, 557 (2001); Timothy G. 
Pollock & Violina P. Rindova, Media Legitimation Effects in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 46 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 631 (2003); Maxwell McCombs et al., Candidate Images in Spanish Elections: 
Second-level Agenda Setting Effects, 74 JOURNALISM COMM. Q. 703 (1997).     
36 See Hayagreeva Rao et al., Fool’s Gold: Social Proof in the Initiation and Abandonment of 
Coverage by Wall Street Analysts, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 502 (2001).   
37 Timothy Pollock is a professor of management and organization studies at the Smeal College of 
Business at Pennsylvania State University.  Penn State, Smeal College of Business, Faculty Directory: 
Tim Pollock, http://php.smeal.psu.edu/smeal/dirbio/displayBio.php?t_user_id=txp14.  His research over 
the year has focused on how social and political factors, including media accounts, have influenced firm 
performance, survival, alliance formation activities, and executive compensation, particularly in the 
initial public offerings market.  Id.        
38 Violina Rindova is a professor of business at the McCombs School of Business at The 
University of Texas at Austin.  University of Texas, Austin, Robert H. Smith School of Business, 
Faculty Directory: Violina Rindova, http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/Faculty/vrindova/.  Her research has 
focused on intangible assets, such as corporate reputation and firm celebrity, value creation, and 
competitive advantage.  Id.   
39 See Pollock & Rindova, supra note 35. 
40 See id. at 631.   
41 See id. at 633. 
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available about a firm, the less “risky” that firm is perceived to be.42  Do the media 
actively shape a firm’s reputation in the minds of the public, or do they simply 
report the preconceptions already held by the public?  Research exists to support 
both claims.  According to David Weaver and G. Cleveland Wilhoit, journalists 
place a premium on neutral, unbiased reporting.43  Deephouse refuted this notion, 
emphasizing that the media presents “reputational assessments” to its audience.44  
For example, firms that received more positive media coverage were ranked higher 
on Fortune Magazine’s “Most Admired Companies of the Year” list.45   
Strictly speaking, firm-sponsored forms of advertising (e.g. television 
adverts) do not constitute sources of public information according to the definition 
of Uzzi and his colleagues (and adopted herein).  Such advertisements have not 
been disseminated by a third party meaning that the veracity of the information can 
be questioned.  With that said, this paper will turn its attention to law firm 
advertising because it highlights the enormous importance firms place on their 
reputations.   
Self-promotion to actively solicit business can be viewed as unprofessional 
by many PSF employees, particularly those who work in the legal industry.  
Attorneys view their profession as a noble one, distinguished by its rich history and 
long-held traditions, and they are wary of behavior that might denigrate it.46  
Advertising is viewed as taboo—the domain of used-car salesman, miracle 
weight-loss pills, and late-night infomercials.  Yet, law firms are increasingly 
providing “service handbooks” which provide details about staff attorneys and 
their practice areas.47  These brochures are sent to potential clients through direct 
mail campaigns.  However, firms are quick to refute the notion that these 
guidebooks are promotional and stress that they are meant for purely informational 
purposes.48 
With such an emphasis placed on safeguarding reputation, it must be queried 
whether a media-crafted reputation actually affects firm performance.  Admittedly, 
“performance” is an ambiguous concept in itself, especially when dealing with the 
legal industry.  Whilst some law firms might be keen to see a steadily increasing 
bottom line from quarter to quarter, others might be less profit-driven and more 
concerned with client satisfaction or the pursuit of justice.  Pollock and Rindova 
demonstrated that information relayed by the media on public offering firms 
profoundly influenced the IPO selections of investors.49  More significant in 
shaping investor preferences is the tenor of media coverage, which the authors 
                                                          
42 See id. 
43 See DAVID H. WEAVER & G. CLEVELAND WILHOIT, THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST: A PORTRAIT 
OF U.S. NEWSPEOPLE AND THEIR WORK (1986).  
44 Deephouse, supra note 18, at 1097.  
45 See Fombrun & Shanley, supra note 6, at 246, 252. 
46 See Lloyd C. Harris & Nigel F. Piercy, Barriers to Marketing Development in the Barristers’ 
Profession, 18 SERVICE INDUSTRIES J. 19, 25 (1998).   
47 See id. at 24. 
48 See id. at 25. 
49 See Pollock & Rindova, supra note 35.  
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reason increases the perception of value of a firm.50  This inference is supported by 
the fact that positive and negative stories about law firms are often accepted as true 
by the public.51  This research has profound implications for law firms which, at 
their core, must be able to attract and retain clients.  
C. Subsequent Selection: Retention and Defection 
Thus far, this paper has concentrated on an investment bank’s selection of a 
new law firm, one that a bank has never contracted with before.  “Subsequent 
selection” refers to choices to re-retain the services of a previously used law firm.  
While nascent selection forced a PSF to choose legal services without firsthand 
knowledge, subsequent selection allows a client to reflect on prior dealings with a 
law firm.  Not surprisingly, during subsequent selections, criteria like previous 
personal experiences and caring for the client’s needs become crucial in a PSF’s 
decision to continue using a particular law firm.52  Overall, law firms receive most 
of their new contracts from existing clients.53  Firm reputation might explain an 
investment bank’s initial choice of external legal services, but other factors likely 
account for the subsequent instances in which the law firm is used.   
Services can be divided into two categories: those that are best managed as 
one-time transactions and those best delivered through a preexisting customer 
relationship.54  Professional services fall into the latter category.  These business 
relationships are frequently long-term—lasting from seven to eleven years,55 and it 
has been argued that the relationship between the client and the service provider 
becomes stronger with the passage of time.56  The fact that trust and 
communicative ability often develop over time lends credence to this argument.57 
A prior relationship has two effects on future interactions with a firm.58  
First, trust develops between the client and service-provider.  This trust is 
grounded in historical precedent—both parties have fulfilled their respective ends 
of a contract in the past; hence, it seems safer for the client to retain the same firm 
than to switch to an “untested” one.  Secondly, inertia might draw a client to a 
previously contracted firm, and this occurrence is associated with the concept of 
embeddedness. 
                                                          
50 See id. at 631. 
51 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Elsbach, Managing Organisational Legitimacy in the California Cattle 
Industry: The Construction and Effectiveness of Verbal Accounts, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 57 (1994).  
52 See Day & Barksdale, supra note 4.  
53 See Palihawadana & Barnes, supra note 7, at 102. 
54 See ADRIAN PALMER, PRINCIPLES OF SERVICES MARKETING (1994). 
55 See Dennis W. Carlton, The Rigidity of Prices, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 637, 655-56 (1986).  
56 See Daniel A. Levinthal & Mark Fichman, Dynamics of Interorganizational Attachments: 
Auditor-Client Relationships, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 345, 348 (1988).  
57 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 55 (Feb. 
1963).  
58 See Levinthal & Fichman, supra note 56, at 366.  
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1. Embeddedness and Price 
Gulati and Gargiulo discussed the influence of uncertainty and 
embeddedness, including prior mutual alliances and common third-party 
associations, on the formation of new social relationships.59  Uzzi presented a more 
detailed account of embeddedness and its effect on firm performance.60  He 
highlighted efficiency, mutually-agreed upon problem solving strategies, and 
reduced search costs as benefits of embeddedness.61  PSFs can be unique 
organizations, and they might favor service providers who have already learned the 
nuances of their firms and acquired relation-specific knowledge.  These 
relationships may only strengthen over time.62  Both the client and service provider 
would be more likely to accommodate the wishes of the other and invest in 
“specialized equipment.”63  At the same time, they would acquire knowledge 
particular to the other organization.  Knowledge and investment particular to one 
client—”specialized investments”— cannot easily be applied to another client.64  
The termination of a relationship with such a high degree of asset specificity 
thereby diminishes the value of such specialized investments.  Thus, “where asset 
specificity is great, buyer and seller will make special efforts to design an 
exchange that has good continuity properties.”65  The service provider has a strong 
incentive to retain clients— a company can improve profits twenty-five to eighty-
five percent just by retaining five percent more clients.66  By focusing its attention 
on retaining clients, a firm also saves on the cost of marketing to new firms.67  
Uzzi, Lancaster, and Dunlap explored the relationship between social ties 
and the price of legal services.  Their study of mega-law firms incorporated 
numerous theories of organization, including embeddedness, transaction cost 
economics, and reputation.  Their study demonstrated that embeddedness was 
inversely related to price: the closer the ties between a particular law firm and a 
professional service corporation, the lower the cost of legal services.68  In the long 
run, however, these embedded relationships proved mutually beneficial.  
Professional service corporations enjoyed reduced prices for legal work billed per 
hour, which provided an incentive to continue using the same law firm.69  These 
                                                          
59 See Ranjay Gulati & Martin Gargiulo, Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come From?, 
104 AM. J. SOC. 1439 (1999).   
60 See Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of 
Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35 (1997). 
61 See id. at 38, 47, 49-50.  
62 See, e.g., OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS (1975).  
63 Id. 
64 See Oliver Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 
AM. J. SOC. 548 (1981) (proposing the theories of “value” and “asset specificity”).  
65 See id. at 555.  
66 Frederick Reichheld & David W. Kenny, The Hidden Advantages of Customer Retention, 13 J. 
RETAIL BANKING 19 (Winter, 1990).  
67 See PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT: ANALYSIS, PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION AND 
CONTROL (1994).  
68 See Uzzi et al., supra note 3, at 106.  
69 See id. at 107. 
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law firms, in turn, increased their profits over time because of the steady stream of 
work provided by a single client.70 
2. Defection and Client Satisfaction 
Despite the perceived benefits of PSFs maintaining long-term relationships 
with other firms, “defection” does take place.  Defection occurs when a PSF breaks 
some or all of its ties to a service provider and retains another firm.  Clients defect 
to cut costs, “trade up” to a superior product, obtain better service, and to placate 
internal or external political forces.71  A long-term relationship that ceases to 
evolve with the client is also at risk for defection.72  For example, a client’s needs 
may have expanded with the passage of time, requiring new forms of expertise 
from the service provider.  Service providers must perceive this shift and adapt to 
their evolving client, ensuring that they continue to offer “value and satisfaction.”73 
Continuing to offer value and satisfaction to their clients can be a difficult 
proposition for some law firms, especially considering that the interests of law 
firms and their corporate clients may be at odds.  According to Leblebici, “[a] law 
firm’s objective is to increase return to its partners; a client’s goal is to maximize 
value and minimize costs.”74  Current practices within law firms exacerbate this 
conflict.  One-third of the revenue generated by associates is transferred to a firm’s 
partners as deferred compensation.75  Hence, an associate is encouraged to bill the 
most hours possible to increase his personal income and that of the partners.  One 
apparent problem with this payment method is that it rewards attorneys solely on 
the basis of hours billed—not on the quality of the results delivered to clients.  If 
Leblebici’s thesis is correct, the billable-hours method of payment has interesting 
consequences for the legal profession, especially when placed in the context of 
Fombrun and Shanley’s study on reputation and retention.  Theoretically, a large 
firm could maintain a positive reputation by billing an increased number of hours 
(hence generating greater profits) in spite of not always meeting client 
expectations. 
Palihawadana and Barnes postulated that “satisfaction with service” was the 
chief reason clients continued to retain a law firm.76  However, how does one 
define satisfaction?  Over the last three decades, the academic literature has 
attempted to establish a framework for understanding this amorphous concept.  
LaBarbara and Mazursky described the concept as “the extent to which a product 
                                                          
70 See id. 
71 See Palihawadana & Barnes, supra note 7, at 105 (quoting Glenn Desouza, Designing a 
Customer Retention Plan, 13 J. BUS. STRATEGY 20, 24 (1992)).  
72 See Levinthal & Fichman, supra note 56, at 366.  
73 See HELEN PECK ET AL., RELATIONSHIP MARKETING STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION 28 
(1999). 
74 Huseyin Leblebici, Determining the Value of Legal Knowledge: Billing and Compensation 
Practices in Law Firms, in MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW 
PERSPECTIVES 117, 128 (Laura Empson ed., 2007).  
75 See id. 
76 See Palihawadana & Barnes, supra note 7, at 105. 
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(or service) meets customers’ expectations (or requirements).”77  In their study of 
architectural and engineering firms, Day and Barksdale linked the notion of 
“satisfaction” to “quality,” showing that clients used similar criteria when 
evaluating both ideas.  The factors were: “(1) provider’s understanding of the 
client’s needs and interests; (2) the provider’s relationship and communication 
skills; (3) the provider’s conformance to contractual and administrative 
requirements; and (4) actual performance.”78  Jackson and his colleagues carried 
out an extensive study on how CEOs evaluate legal services.  Results showed that 
CEOs ranked legal expertise, interpersonal relationships with clients, and the 
quality of the written product as the most important determinants when assessing 
the quality of a law firm’s work.79  Finally, Young and Denize disputed the 
importance of quality to firm retention.  Demonstrating that service providers and 
their clients can maintain strong ties even when their clients believe that the quality 
of service is subpar, Young and Denize concluded that asset specificity, inertia, 
and embedded ties were more important indicators of retention than quality.80 
3. Social Networks 
WOM output is another method of exploring client satisfaction in the post-
service stage.  Output WOM is the sharing of information about a previously-
retained PSF with another individual or organization.  A PSF is more likely to 
express an opinion of a law firm that it has retained for a long period of time.81  
Expertise in a client’s area of need, approachability, and the qualifications of law 
firm personnel are prominent reasons for recommending a law firm to a 
professional colleague.82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 Id. at 106 (quoting Priscilla LaBarbara & David Mazursky, A Longitudinal Assessment of 
Consumer Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction: The Dynamic Aspect of the Cognitive Process, 20 J. 
MARKETING RES. 393 (1983)).  
78 Day & Barksdale, supra note 4, at 88. 
79 D.W. Jackson et. al., Business Executives’ Evaluation of Various Aspects of Outside Legal 
Services, in SERVICES MARKETING IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 130 (Thomas M. Bloch et al. eds., 
1985).  
80 See Palihawadana & Barnes, supra note 7, at 104.  
81 See File et al., supra note 29, at 311. 
82 See Nick Ellis & Claire Watterson, Client Perceptions of Regional Law Firms and Their 
Implications for Marketing Management, 21 SERVICE INDUSTRIES J. 100, 112 (2001).  
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IV. RESEARCH METHODS 
A. Data Collection 
Data for my project was provided by executives from nine investment banks 
located in Europe or the United States.83  These executives were typically attorneys 
overseeing a bank’s legal services for a specific region of the world.84  My 
interactions with all of these sources took the form of semi-structured,85 open-
ended interviews which occurred either in person or via telephone.86  Interview 
questions were designed to garner responses that would aid me in my quest to find 
answers to the questions guiding my research87: 
 
Who within an investment bank is empowered to contract outside lawyers? 
How does reputation affect client choice? 
To what extent do investment banks rely on their social networks to select 
external legal services? 
Are clients attracted to individual lawyers, law firms, or both? How does this 
                                                          
83 My exploration of the ways in which investment banks retain external counsel began in 
November 2007 and spanned nine months, concluding in August of the following year.  During the first 
four months, I immersed myself in the academic literature and theories of research related to my project 
goals.  This information has been detailed extensively in earlier sections.  The next four months focused 
on data collection, and the final month concentrated on data analysis and presentation.   
84 To gain access to appropriate initial interview sources, I emailed a description of my project to 
the legal or media relations departments of the world’s top fifty investment banks, as ranked by the 
Vault Guide to the Top 50 Banking Employers (2008 Edition).  Firms interested in participating in my 
project would then reply to my email with the contact details of the person best able to assist.  Some of 
these initial contacts were able to provide the names of colleagues in other banks who would be able to 
impart further data. 
85 Since my interviews were semi-structured, it is not possible to provide a script of interview 
questions.   
86 Interviews ranged from thirty-five to seventy-five minutes, lasting forty-five minutes on average.  
I took detailed field notes of each interview and often asked respondents to repeat statements to ensure 
that direct quotations were accurately recorded.  Following each successive interview, I synthesized my 
notes, concentrating on the emerging themes.  By augmenting my list of interview questions following 
each successive interview, I overlapped the processes of data collection and analysis.  See generally 
BARNEY GLASER & ANSELM STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES OF 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967) (describing the merits of semi-structured interviews and the analysis 
thereof).  Overlapping the processes of data collection and data analysis allowed me “to take advantage 
of flexible data collection . . . .the freedom to make adjustments during the data collection process.”  
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Building Theories from Case Study Research, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 532, 539 
(1989).  After completing an interview, I examined my notes to pull out themes that were important 
(within-case analysis).  These provided the background for the next interview I would conduct.  In this 
way, I allowed the information gathered during each interview to build upon previously obtained data.  
When all of the interviews had been completed, I once again reviewed the notes of each interview, 
coding statements that reflected themes deduced from multiple interviews (cross-case analysis).  This 
process allowed me to construct the overarching descriptive themes, drawing parallels between them 
when appropriate.  See HERBERT J. RUBIN & IRENE S. RUBIN, QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWING: THE ART 
OF HEARING DATA (1995). 
87 While many studies are organized to test hypotheses, mine was more focused on theory building.  
The lack of academic research focused on my area of study made the formulation of precise hypotheses 
difficult; thus, I designed my study to explore the answers to research questions.  See Eisenhardt, supra 
note 86 (explaining the qualitative methods that I believed were best suited to my project aims).  
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preference affect choice? 
What qualities do clients believe are indicative of superior law firms? Do 
these qualities change based on past usage of a law firm? 
More specifically, I asked each respondent which individuals participated in 
the process of choosing external counsel and what factors they considered when 
making such a selection.  I also queried the circumstances that would lead in-house 
attorneys to retain an outside law firm.  Because “reputation” can have very 
personal meanings, I always asked my interview subjects to explain their 
perception of this term.   
B. Research Context 
For organizations, the process of selecting external counsel is often complex 
and multifaceted.  Various individuals within a firm could be empowered to retain 
outside legal services, and they can do so in scores of unique circumstances.  
Before examining the data in the next section, this article explores the mechanisms 
organizations have in place to aid the process of contracting external firms.  To 
clarify, the aim in this section is to provide a suitable research context to make the 
results enunciated in Section V more understandable. 
1. In-House Legal Counsel 
Discussing “external counsel” is slightly presumptuous as it implies the 
existence of internal counsel—attorneys directly employed by the organization.  
To be fair, it may not be economically feasible for smaller firms to have lawyers 
on the payroll.  They could rely exclusively on the expertise of an independent law 
firm.  In these situations, a procurement specialist, a person who contracts outside 
services, may be utilized to evaluate and retain law firms.   
Larger PSFs typically have legal departments in some manifestation.  These 
“general counsel” are solicitors or barristers in an English sense or members of a 
state, appellate, or federal bar in the United States.  Aside from providing legal 
advice to their corporate employers, general counsel often oversee teams of 
attorneys, paralegals, and legal secretaries within the firm context.  In situations 
when their organization needs to retain external counsel, general counsel are often 
instrumental in the selection process. 
Of my nine interview subjects, eight were certified attorneys overseeing 
legal departments ranging in size from five to 250 lawyers.  One interviewee was a 
procurement specialist.  His investment bank, because of its small size, relied 
exclusively on external firms for its legal needs.  These professionals were 
employed by investment banks in the United States or Europe that employed 
globally forty-eight to 280,000 people.  This information is summarized more 
explicitly in the tables below.88 
 
                                                          
88 All subjects agreed to be interviewed on the condition that their identities and the identities of 
their firms remain confidential.  To honor their wishes, I have provided stand-in names in place of their 
actual names and the names of the firms that employ them. 
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Table 2  Interview subjects  
  
Resp. Position Investment bank 
Bank branch 
location 
Mr. 
McCarthy General Counsel  Rhine Bank London 
Mr. 
Stengel 
Managing Director, 
Legal Department Swiss Financial London 
Mr. 
Huggins General Counsel  Keystone Investors Pittsburgh 
Mr. 
Martin Head of Legal Services 
Frankfurt Securities 
Investment Bank  London 
Mr. 
Lemon General Counsel  Nippon International London 
Mr. Houk Procurement Specialist Hamilton Grey  New York 
Mr. 
Dickey General Counsel  Alpha New York 
Mr. 
McGraw 
Director of Legal 
Services 
Britannia Bank 
Corporation London 
Ms. Harris 
Head of Legal 
Department Columbia Capital Moscow 
Source: The author’s research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1  Investment banks profiled 
  
Investment bank 
Main bank 
headquarters 
Total global bank size 
(individuals employed) 
Rhine Bank Germany 75,000 
Swiss Financial Switzerland 82,000 
Keystone Investors USA 1,200 
Frankfurt Securities 
Investment Bank UK 6,000 
Nippon International Japan 15,000 
Hamilton Grey USA 48 
Alpha USA 2,100 
Britannia Bank 
Corporation UK 280,000 
Columbia Capital Russia 120 
Source: The author’s research 
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Table 3  Legal department breakdown of profiled investment bank branches 
  
Investment bank Number of legal department employees 
Rhine Bank 150 
Swiss Financial 100 
Keystone Investors 36 
Frankfurt Securities Investment Bank 110 
Nippon International 100 
Hamilton Grey 0 
Alpha 40 
Britannia Bank Corporation 260 
Columbia Capital 5 
Source: The author’s research 
2. Elite Law Firms 
Both the United States and the United Kingdom have groups of law firms 
that are widely regarded as the “most prestigious” by businesses and other 
professional service firms.  Prestige, like reputation, is not precisely defined; 
however, it is not within the scope of this project to explain why certain firms are 
deemed higher in prestige.  Nevertheless, since this factor may influence the law 
firm choices of investment banks, it is worthwhile to point out that ceteris paribus, 
some firms are regarded as more prestigious than others.   
In the United Kingdom, one group of law firms that arguably benefits from a 
perception of prestige and is associated with high performance is the “Magic 
Circle.”89  Membership in the Magic Circle is exclusive to five London-based law 
firms: Allen and Overy, Clifford Chance, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 
Linklaters, and Slaughter & May. 
Falling directly below the Magic Circle in terms of prestige is the “Silver 
Circle.”  These are powerful mid-market English law firms that have profits per 
partner levels on par with the Magic Circle despite employing fewer attorneys and 
generating less revenue.  Typically, these firms draw their clients from within the 
UK.  The Silver Circle designation traces its roots to a 2005 article in The Lawyer, 
which applied the term to five firms: Ashurst, Macfarlanes, SJ Berwin, Herbert 
Smith, and Travers Smith.90   
Law firms in the United States are less stratified, reputation-wise, than their 
                                                          
89 While the five firms encompassing the United Kingdom’s Magic Circle were not labeled as such 
until the 1996 edition of The Legal 500, they were linked together as early as 1989.  Compare THE 
LEGAL 500: THE MAJOR LAW FIRMS IN ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND WALES, AND FOREIGN LAW FIRMS 
IN LONDON (John Pritchard ed., 1989) (grouping the later-named Magic Circle firms together), with 
THE LEGAL 500: THE CLIENTS’ GUIDE TO UK LAW FIRMS (John Pritchard ed., 1996) (applying the term 
“Magic Circle” to the firms).  Tracing its origins to The Magic Circle, a London-based organization for 
professional and amateur magicians distinguished by its extreme secrecy, the term has been readily 
applied to the most prestigious law firms in the country over the course of the last decade. 
90 Dan Box, “Silver Circle” Firms Upset the Legal Order, TIMES (U.K.), Aug. 28, 2005, available 
at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/support_services/article559686.ece.  
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counterparts in the UK; however, certain firms can be pointed to as the American 
elite.  “Big Law” refers to the nation’s largest 250 law firms, as ranked by the 
National Law Journal.  The most prestigious of these firms are further 
distinguished as “White Shoe Firms,”91 though considerable debate exists as to 
which firms qualify as members of this group.  This article applies the term 
synonymously to the firms Peter Sherer nicknamed the “Circle of Elite”: 
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft; Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Covington & 
Burling; Davis Polk & Wardwell; Debevoise & Plimpton; Milbank, Tweed, 
Hadley & McCloy LLP; Shearman & Sterling; Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett; 
Sullivan & Cromwell; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; Proskauer Rose; 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; and Weil, Gotshal & Manges.92  These 
firms share some common characteristics including a moderate size, high profits 
per partner, and a modest international presence.93   
3. Billing Practices 
The billing practices of law firms and the complications associated with 
current remuneration systems, for the most part, are not within the scope of this 
project.  However, because academic theory has suggested that cost could be a 
determinant in the procurement choices of organizations, this section provides a 
brief overview of the common payment procedures of lawyers and law firms.94   
There are three dominant billing schemes utilized by law firms.  Of these, the 
most straightforward is the fixed-rate system, whereby a client pays a flat fee for a 
legal service.  This system, despite being easily understood by clients, is fraught 
with complications.  Since it does not account for the time an attorney spent 
providing a particular service, the price charged may be unfair to either the lawyer 
or the client.95  This system also removes the quality of the legal service provided 
from the payment equation.  Contingency fee arrangements, in contrast, allow an 
attorney to collect a percent (typically one-third) of the client’s recovery in 
litigation.96  However, an early settlement could net a lawyer a handsome payment 
for little work, or a loss at trial could net him nothing.  By far the most favored 
billing method for law firms is the billable hour.  Firms bill clients a set monetary 
amount for each hour that an attorney spends working for them.  This system 
ensures that lawyers are paid for their time, but it could also discourage attorneys 
                                                          
91 Writer William Safire traces the origin of this term to a style of shoe popular among the upper-
class New Englanders who staffed elite PSFs in the early twentieth century.  See William Safire, On 
Language; Gimme the Ol’ White Shoe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/1997/11/09/magazine/on-language-gimme-the-ol-white-shoe.html. 
92 Peter D. Sherer, Your Competitors: Mapping the Competitive Space of Large U.S. Law Firms: A 
Strategic Group Perspective, in MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW 
PERSPECTIVES 162, 170 (Laura Empson ed., 2007). 
93 See id. 
94 See Leblebici, supra note 74, at 117 (providing a comprehensive analysis of law firm billing 
practices, including their histories, complications, and suggestions for improvement).  
95 See id. at 127. 
96 See id. at 128. 
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from working efficiently.97 
V. RESULTS 
A. Why Do Banks Retain External Counsel? 
Of the nine investment banks profiled, eight had some form of an internal 
legal department.  Yet, all of the banks routinely utilized the services of external 
counsel.  For one bank, external legal services were operationally necessary.  
Hamilton Grey, a very small investment bank, outsourced all of its legal needs and 
employed no practicing lawyers.  Representatives of the other eight investment 
banks cited three reasons for retaining external attorneys: transfer of risk, financial 
benefit, and expertise. 
Four investment banks used internal law firms to minimize the risks 
associated with certain types of transactions, such as leveraged buyouts.  Retaining 
external law firms places the onus for the legal aspects of a transaction on a party 
outside of the investment bank.  Hence, disputes stemming from this work, as well 
as any civil suits, will be directed primarily at the external law firm and not the 
investment bank.   
Some large transactions force us to take on a lot of debt, to assume a great deal of 
risk.  In that type of climate, we’re looking to shove off as much risk onto others as 
possible.  Spread it around a little.  So you can understand why we would pass off 
responsibility for legal matters onto external providers.98  
Rhine Bank, Keystone Investors, Nippon International, and Frankfurt 
Securities outsourced legal work for financial reasons.   
“Essentially, it’s a question of what makes sense to do internally versus 
externally.  What is the most cost-effective way of handling our legal affairs?”99  
“We don’t deal with a lot of litigation here.  Therefore, it does not make 
financial sense to hire internal litigators.  Our branch in the U.S., however, faces 
much more litigation, so they hire those people.”100   
For these banks, it seemed that cost-benefit analyses played a part in whether 
certain legal services were managed internally or outsourced. 
Law firm expertise was named by three investment banks as a reason for 
seeking external legal services.  Frankfurt Securities, Alpha, and Rhine Bank used 
their internal legal departments to handle routine legal matters, but relied upon law 
firms for unique or complex subjects, or for transactions occurring in foreign or 
unfamiliar jurisdictions.  In these situations, the investment banks felt more 
comfortable turning to expert advice from attorneys outside of the organizations.   
                                                          
97 See id. at 128-29. 
98 Mr. Martin, Frankfurt Securities Investment Bank. 
99 Mr. McCarthy, Rhine Bank. 
100 Mr. Lemon, Nippon International. 
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B. Who Retains External Counsel? 
The nine profiled investment banks afforded their respective general counsel 
varying degrees of authority in the selection of external firms.  Hamilton Grey and 
Keystone Investors entrusted their procurement advisors with full authority to 
contract law firms of their choosing.  Rhine Bank, Swiss Financial, Nippon 
International, and Britannia Bank Corporation permitted their internal counsel to 
retain external services from a list of preapproved law firms (the panel system).  
Finally, Frankfurt Securities, Alpha, and Columbia Capital required their boards of 
directors to make the final selection.  However, all of the banks utilized the “panel 
system” in some form.   
Respondents from the latter three banks, when describing their methods of 
choosing external counsel, explicated a difference between the de jure selection 
process and the one occurring de facto.  In principle, the task of the general 
counsel of these banks was to present their boards of directors with options 
whenever the investment bank required external representation, highlighting the 
strengths and weaknesses of each firm, the costs of each, and the attorneys from 
each firm who would be involved.  However, in practice, general counsel at 
Frankfurt Securities, Alpha, and Columbia Capital selected external law firms from 
lists—panels of law firms favored by the organization.  Thus, internal counsel was 
free, within the confines of the list of approved firms, to use their discretion to 
retain legal services.   
“Procurement functions through delegated authority.  Theoretically, my 
choices have to be approved by the board, but in practice, I’ve negotiated rates 
with a number of law firms, and the eventual selection comes from this panel of 
firms.”101  
One must be careful not to undervalue the role of the board of directors in 
procurement, especially if the board plays a part in determining organizational 
direction and goals.  Mr. Dickey described how the subprime mortgage crisis, 
perpetuated by the bursting of the housing bubble in the United States, directly 
affected his job:  
There is a constant debate between high road and low road strategies—whether 
we’re focused on revenue generation or cost control.  It’s all very bureaucratic.  If I 
have a doubt about the cost of firm I want, I have to pick up the phone and call 
someone internally—find out their perception of the business environment.102  
Four investment banks—Rhine Bank, Swiss Financial, Nippon International, 
and Britannia Bank Corporation—admitted that they had a list of favored firms 
from which they selected external counsel.  The law firms on these panels had 
been approved previously by the banks’ governing boards, and general counsel 
could use any of the firms on their respective bank’s panel at their discretion.  
Retaining a law firm not already on a bank’s panel was much more difficult for 
internal attorneys: 
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“A panel is essentially a list of firms that we have relationships with.  I can’t 
think of a reason why we would need to look for providers not on our panel, but if 
we did, it would be very complicated and require internal meetings and board 
approval.”103  
Even Hamilton Grey and Keystone Investors, banks that allowed internal 
counsel or a procurement specialist full discretion to choose external firms, almost 
always used one of two firms for their legal needs.  The reasons for this occurrence 
will be addressed later in this section.  In the interim, this article turns its attention 
to how law firms are selected—the characteristics banks consider when retaining 
external counsel. 
C. Which Law Firm will be Selected?  
Irrespective of whether a governing board or general counsel made the final 
selection decision, all of the banks profiled had a procurement staff responsible for 
examining the positive and negative traits of law firms under consideration.  The 
factors they considered in their selections are subsequently examined.   
1. Expertise   
All nine of the investment bank executives interviewed named firm expertise 
as the primary factor influencing their decisions.  To these individuals, expertise 
encompassed a firm’s intimate knowledge of a specific area of the law, as well as 
its institutional capital—the attorneys it employed.  At the same time, the interview 
subjects stressed the importance of “bench depth”—the ability of a single law firm 
to oversee all aspects of a transaction, from its inception through any litigation.  
Hence, they favored full service law firms over boutique firms, but they still strove 
for representation possessing the level of institutional knowledge of specialized 
firms.   
If we are taking part in a leveraged buyout in a foreign country, for example, I want 
knowledgeable advice on all of the nuances of that transaction from the firm we’re 
using.  I want to know about the regulatory climate of the country; I want to know 
about the tax laws; and I want consultation on the more mundane as well: on 
contracts, etc.104   
 The staff employed by a law firm was a crucial consideration in the decisions 
of the interviewees.  One law firm may have a staff with extensive knowledge of 
mergers and acquisitions, while another may excel at litigation.   
 “Look, you wouldn’t ask [criminal defense attorney] Bob Shapiro for advice 
on hostile takeovers.”105   
 “I want outside lawyers who are smarter than me.  They should be a step 
ahead.  Otherwise, what’s the point in hiring them?”106 
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 Seven respondents believed that the individual lawyers working on the banks’ 
transactions were more important than the firms that they worked for.   
 “We hire lawyers, not law firms.”107  
 Two firms, Keystone Investors and Britannia Bank Corporation, felt that the 
law firm itself took precedence over the lawyers who were in its employ.   
 In an attempt to gauge just how committed the interviewees were to the 
individual over the law firm, I next asked them if they would follow an attorney if 
he transferred from one firm to another.  The responses to this question were 
varied.  Britannia Bank Corporation and Hamilton Grey would not transfer their 
respective business from one firm to another for the sake of an attorney. 
 “We’ve worked hard to build relationships with the law firms on our panel.  
Our loyalty is with them.”108   
 Keystone Investors, likewise, would be reluctant to switch firms because a 
lawyer transferred; however, this stance was conditional: 
 
Several people have left firms over the years, and we haven’t followed a single one 
to his new firm.  But, no one who has left has been a key player for us.  If a key 
player were to leave, I guess it would be difficult not to switch over to the new 
firm.109  
 Frankfurt Securities, Alpha, and Columbia Capital stated that they would start 
retaining the services of the lawyer’s new firm.  The remaining three firms—Rhine 
Bank, Swiss Financial, and Nippon International—would switch to the new firm if 
two conditions were met.  First, the attorney’s new law firm would have to be 
similar in prestige and stature to his previous one, and secondly, that firm would 
have to be on the legal panel of the investment bank making the choice. 
 “If he switched to a firm not already on our legal panel, it would be extremely 
difficult to follow him.  The board would have to step in and approve the firm 
first.”110   
 Lastly, the respondents felt that results were the true litmus test for the 
evaluation of law firm expertise.  These individuals were in agreement as to what 
constituted good results: “the completion of the service expeditiously and cost-
effectively;” if external counsel represented the bank in a litigation proceeding, 
“good results” meant that the bank “won the case in court or reached a settlement 
favorable to the firm.”111  
2. Social Networks  
All of the respondents relied on their social networks to assist with their 
procurement choices.  For them, a trusted referral of a certain law firm or lawyer 
dramatically pushed them toward making that selection.  These referrals came 
from colleagues in other banks, professional organizations, and attorneys.  The 
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amount of credibility the interviewees placed in a referral was contingent upon 
how close of a relationship they had with the referrer and whether the 
recommended legal advisor had completed similar work for him.   
Every banking executive confirmed that he would hold a referral from a 
counterpart in another bank in the highest regard.   
We’re looking to retain law firms with high degrees of expertise.  Really, expertise 
is a subjective concept.  It has no definitive meaning.  So, how do we determine if a 
firm we’re thinking of hiring is any good?  We do it by asking trusted 
colleagues.112  
One respondent, Ms. Harris from Columbia Capital, relied upon a corporate 
counsel association to share information about external providers.  Frankfurt 
Securities’ Mr. Martin also utilized contacts from his days of working at a Silver 
Circle firm for recommendations:  
The law firm network is a small and intimate one.  All of us corporate counsels 
[sic] started out working in law firms.  We all have mates we’ve left behind still 
working there.  So we pick up the phone.  “Who’s a good guy for derivatives at 
Linklaters?  Do you know anyone at Clifford Chance who does excellent M&A 
work?”  In this network, a verbal referral really matters.113   
Despite the fact that respondents based much of their selection criteria on the 
recommendations of others, many revealed an unwillingness to communicate a 
negative opinion of a particular provider to a colleague.  Nippon International, 
Alpha, Keystone Investors, and Hamilton Grey expressed this sentiment.  They 
would only share an opinion about a certain law firm if it were positive.  If asked 
about a firm they had a negative experience with, they would either provide a 
neutral assessment (“the firm was fair”) or, if possible, deny using that particular 
firm.   
 “It would be very rare that I’d express a negative opinion.  What’s that 
expression your mother tells you?  ‘If you don’t have anything nice to say, don’t 
say anything at all.’”114  
Columbia Capital and Rhine Bank would be reluctant to express a negative 
opinion of a law firm, but might do so under certain circumstances.  Both bank 
representatives pointed to issues of confidentiality connected with the attorney-
client relationship.  However, if they were close to the person enquiring about a 
firm, and if they were talking informally (“off the record”), they would feel 
comfortable relating a negative experience.   
Mr. Stengel, internal counsel for Swiss Financial, stated that he would never 
share his personal opinion of an external firm with a colleague.  Yet, he would feel 
comfortable expressing the collective opinion of the bank’s legal department, even 
if that opinion were negative: 
The problem with sharing an opinion about a law firm’s performance is that it’s 
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wholly subjective and based on the interpretation of a single person.  We as an 
organization form an opinion collectively about the firms we work with.  It’s how 
we know whether or not we will ever be using a firm again.  I would willingly 
share this opinion with corporate counsel at another investment bank because it 
represents more than just the perception of a single individual.115   
 Two investment banks, Frankfurt Securities and Britannia Bank Corporation, 
defied the consensus of their peers, saying they would have no qualms about 
sharing a negative law firm experience with colleagues. 
 “My experiences with external providers, whether positive or negative, are 
word-of-mouth messages communicated on jungle drums.”116  
3. Cost 
With the exception of Rhine Bank, all of the profiled investment banks 
named cost as a major determinant of which external law firm would be selected.  
However, five of these banks were careful to state that it was not a primary 
consideration, but rather “the third most important factor” ranking below such 
criteria as expertise, reputation, and staffing.  Price was most often balanced 
against expertise to assess the value of the service being provided by the external 
law firm.  Corporate counsel sought to maximize the legal expertise available to 
them while minimizing the cost of that advice.  Eight interviewees stressed that 
superior law firms billed their clients “fairly.”  A “fair price,” in their estimation, 
was one competitive with the rates charged by law firms of similar stature for 
comparable work, completed in the same amount of time.  When making this 
assessment, the interview subjects compared the billing systems utilized by law 
firms, as well as any discount being offered by the external provider based on work 
volume. 
In their discussions of fair pricing as a characteristic of superior law firms, 
respondents revealed deep-seated resentment toward the billable-hours payment 
system.  Mr. Huggins felt that the system was “better for [the law firms].”  Ms. 
Harris stated a preference for fixed-rate billing, fearing that under the billable-
hours system, a law firm would be exceedingly liberal in assessing the number of 
hours it spent providing a service to her bank.   
“I know how long it should take somebody to do something, and how much 
it should cost.  There is so much pressure in firms to bill hours.  They call you to 
wish you ‘happy birthday’ and bill the call to [Columbia Capital].”117   
Hamilton Grey, Frankfurt Securities, Columbia Capital, Britannia Bank 
Corporation, and Keystone Investors had unique billing arrangements with one or 
more law firms.  Some law firms that ordinarily billed by the hour provided a 
fixed-rate alternative to investment banks that used them often.  Typically, this 
option was offered for more commonplace work, such as registering one of the 
bank’s clients with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  Some 
law firms also presented investment banks with a billable hour discount whereby 
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the market rate per hour was inversely proportionate to the volume of work 
provided by the bank.  Keystone Investors took advantage of both forms of 
discounts, and Mr. Huggins reported that the bank benefited more substantially 
from a discount in billing by the hour: 
We see higher quality work from the firm that bills us by the hour.  They’re both 
more knowledgeable and more responsive.  Maybe it’s because the fixed rate is a 
disincentive for the associates working at the other firm.  They aren’t billing hours, 
so they aren’t generating revenue by picking up the phone and calling us.118   
Cost was the main reason that Hamilton Grey decided to dismantle its legal 
department and outsource all of its legal needs.  A partner at a major law firm 
approached the organization with a proposal to assemble a team of attorneys 
specifically for the bank.  The team included an attorney specializing in every area 
of the law relevant to the company; essentially, the law firm provided the bank’s 
legal department.   
“They gave us a legal team and granted us a unique pricing model.  We have 
now outsourced for the same cost of our old internal legal department.  It’s a win-
win: they get volume and predictability.  We get predictability and cost-
efficiency.”119   
4. Reputation 
The respondents perceived the notion of reputation differently.  Four claimed 
it was the overarching viewpoint of a firm—society’s collective evaluation of an 
organization’s performance.  Three interview subjects mentioned that integrity and 
competence were crucial components of a corporate reputation.  Another group of 
three respondents felt that reputation was merely a byproduct of a social network, 
and they formed an opinion of a law firm’s reputation from conversations with 
their colleagues. 
“The world is very small.  Corporate counsels [sic] always discuss the law 
firms we use.  So, a law firm’s reputation is tacit knowledge among internal 
counsel.”120   
One interviewee disagreed with the idea that reputation was a purely social 
construction.  He asserted that reputation emerged from a combination of personal 
interactions with an organization and public perception: 
“A reputation is the public’s perception of something.  When it comes to law 
firms, it’s a bit more complicated than that.  It’s our own experiences with a firm 
coupled with public perception, and we ascertain public perception from the 
anecdotes of colleagues.”121  
Another banking executive regularly consulted popular magazines and trade 
publications for its rankings of the top law firms and lawyers: 
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“I know those rankings catch a lot of heat for being inaccurate or biased, but 
they have been a staple in the industry for years.  The public pays attention to 
them, so we must as well.”122   
All of the respondents expected law firms with very high reputations to be 
more knowledgeable than their less-prestigious peers and to produce positive 
results for the investment banks. 
Prestigious law firms—those with lofty reputations—should be experts in the law, 
and they should be responsive to their clients’ needs.  We expect them to get good 
results.  That means, if it’s litigation, we win.  If it’s registering one of our clients, 
they didn’t get hung up.  If it’s an acquisition, the acquisition went smoothly.123  
Seven investment bank executives reported considering a law firm’s 
reputation in their selection decisions.  Five of these individuals argued that it was 
not the most important criterion in choosing an external provider.  Despite this 
fact, a majority of those same respondents (three of the five) characterized their 
relationships with Magic Circle and White Shoe firms as “very strong.”  Client 
expectations was one reason corporate counsel flocked to elite law firms. 
It’s the nature of our business.  We’re a prominent bank, and our clients expect us 
to use the best resources at our disposal.  We have enormous relations with all of 
the Magic Circle firms, which are viewed as the top firms.  Within that group, we 
pick the top firms based on practice areas.  For example, if we need someone for 
derivatives, we’ll go to Allen and Overy or Linklaters, as they are viewed as the 
best.124  
Internal counsel were careful to select elite law firms to safeguard themselves in 
case complications arose. 
 “No one will ever blame me for hiring Allen and Overy, but if it were a less-
prestigious firm, I could face criticism.  If something unforeseen occurred, a client 
could say ‘why didn’t you hire Allen and Overy?’”125 
 Nippon International and Frankfurt Securities dismissed the role of reputation 
in the purchasing decisions they each made.  Both investment banks stressed that 
they were after quality service, not a brand name. 
 “Reputation is an impression, a subjective opinion.  It’s as fragile as a rose 
petal in the wind.”126   
 Both respondents were also adamant that the best legal service did not come 
from the elite firms, but from those of slightly lesser prestige. 
 “Lawyers at Magic Circle firms are comfortable at the top.  They’re less 
hungry, less eager to impress clients.  The best attorneys are in the Silver Circle, 
those still out to prove something.”127   
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5. Personal Service   
The amount of personal service received from law firms was an important 
factor in the selection decisions of six investment banks—Alpha, Frankfurt 
Securities, Keystone Investors, Rhine Bank, Hamilton Grey, and Columbia 
Capital.  Corporate counsel at these banks considered which firm attorneys were 
working on their cases and the strength of their personal relationships with these 
lawyers.  Five investment banks preferred to interact with the same group of 
lawyers whenever they used a certain law firm.   
“The teams of lawyers we retain at Clifford Chance and Linklaters 
understand the bank and how it operates.”128   
“I would not say that it’s an absolute requirement to use the same lawyers.  If 
we can under the circumstances, we would try to use the same people.”129   
All factors being equal, the investment banks would prefer to work with 
attorneys who were approachable, pleasant, and responsive.   
“The bottom line when scrutinizing an attorney is ‘can we see ourselves 
working with this person?’”130  
However, for certain types of work, such as litigation, some banks would 
prefer an attorney who was abrasive. 
“It really depends on what we need at the time.  If we need to be strongly 
defended in litigation, we will hire an ‘attack dog.’  It’s crucial that we show we’re 
serious.”131  
Rhine Bank also occasionally considered the personality of the attorneys it 
would be working with depending on the type of service it required: 
“If it’s routine legal work, I’d go with the nice guy over the bastard; 
however, if we needed complex work done, you can bet the bank that I’d go with 
the best person I could find regardless of his personality.”132   
Six out of the nine interview subjects commented that personal service 
distinguished the top firms from those deemed mediocre.  Responsiveness and 
partner involvement were amongst the explanations.   
Responsiveness included mainly accessibility factors—for example, a 
general counsel’s ability to reach an attorney within a firm to ask a question and 
the length of time it takes for an external attorney to return a call or respond to an 
email.  One interviewee highlighted the importance of partner involvement in 
client affairs stating:  
“I like to know the names of the partners overseeing the attorneys working 
on my case.  They’re experienced and have seen it all, so it really only makes sense 
to deal with a partner.  Our business is too important to be used for associate 
training.”133   
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6. Beauty Parading 
Beauty parading is a method by which an organization invites potential 
external providers to present and interview before company executives.  Hamilton 
Grey, Swiss Financial, Keystone Investors, Columbia Capital, Alpha, and 
Frankfurt Securities acknowledged that beauty parading was a part of their 
procurement processes.  The investment banks routinely “beauty paraded” between 
two and four external law firms, questioning each one to determine its expertise in 
the legal matter at hand, the firm attorneys who would be providing the service, 
and whether these individuals had any conflicts of interest.  My interviews 
revealed that beauty parading functioned less as selection mechanism and more as 
an elimination tool.  The firms called to beauty parade were all qualified to handle 
the legal service required by the bank, and the executives called upon to evaluate 
the firms seemed to be searching for a reason that an individual firm should not be 
retained.   
By the point of beauty parading, we’re fairly convinced that a firm is capable.  
We’re looking to see if we can work with the people at a certain firm.  A few years 
ago, we brought in someone from a White Shoe firm we were quite impressed with.  
We could not have been in the room with him longer than five minutes before he 
made a crass joke.  My associates were stunned.  It was as if the mood of the room 
had been deflated.  Totally unprofessional.  Needless to say, we didn’t hire them.  
That particular firm lost $100,000 in business because of that one guy.134   
The six investment banks were evenly split as to which individuals 
interviewed the external law firms.  Hamilton Grey, Swiss Financial, and 
Columbia Capital restricted the meetings to corporate counsel and executives of 
the organizations.  In contrast, Keystone Investors, Alpha, and Frankfurt Securities 
asked their clients to attend.  These clients were usually using the investment banks 
for advice on complex transactions, and the banks were retaining external counsel 
on behalf of these clients for clarification on legal matters stemming from those 
transactions.  Frankfurt Securities and Alpha, reserving the final selection choices 
for themselves, invited clients to the interviews simply as a means of keeping them 
informed.   
If a company had a preference for one firm over another, we would try to 
accommodate its wishes, but corporate counsel and our board make the final 
choice.  We would never ordinarily solicit a client’s opinion about the law firms on 
beauty parade, and typically, they defer to our professional judgment.135   
Keystone Investors, on the other hand, had a different philosophy regarding 
client input: 
We work for our clients.  If, after the completion of the interview process, a client 
preferred a specific firm, we would honor that request.  If there were a conflict 
between the general counsel and a client on the choice of a law firm, we would 
make our opinion known, and strongly so, but we would still defer to the client’s 
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preference.136   
Frankfurt Securities, Alpha, and Keystone Investors sometimes appended an 
additional step to the beauty parading process.  If the bank had not retained a law 
firm in a prior instance, it would ask the firm to complete a small amount of legal 
work that had been previously taken on by another law firm.  Or, the new firm 
might be simultaneously working on the same matter as another firm.  Through 
these piloting methods, the investment banks assessed the quality of the new law 
firm and determined whether its services would be retained for more substantial 
matters.   
D. Data Assimilation 
At the beginning of Section IV, five research questions were constructed to 
aid with the data collection process.  This section will assimilate the gathered data, 
grounding it in the applicable research theory and establishing a framework for the 
analysis that follows in Section VI.   
1. It’s My Prerogative: The Power to Choose External Legal Services 
Research by Uzzi et al., File and Prince, Gulati and Gargiulo, and Ellis and 
Watterson has suggested that in-house legal counsel choose external legal 
providers with input from their colleagues.137  The nine interview subjects, for the 
most part, confirmed previous findings as well as research expectations.  In 
discussing who is empowered to make procurement choices for an investment 
bank, it is imperative to distinguish between the de jure and de facto selection 
processes.   
Only one bank explicitly granted general counsel with the authority to retain 
external legal services.  Another, Hamilton Grey, employed no in-house lawyers 
and relied on a procurement specialist to select law firms.  The remaining seven 
investment banks utilized some form of the panel system.  Internal counsel was 
free to exercise discretion in selecting legal service providers from these lists of 
favored law firms.  In practice, in-house lawyers (or procurement specialists) chose 
external counsel for all of the banks profiled; however, in principle, the boards of 
directors made the procurement decisions for three of the investment banks.   
2. I See No Changes: Reputation and Client Choice 
Reputation, as it relates to the selection choices made by investment banks, is 
best examined by considering two factors.  First, how do investment bankers 
define the concept of reputation?  Second, to what extent do the individuals 
making a procurement decision allow their perceptions of a firm’s reputation to 
influence their choices?  
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137 See Uzzi et al., supra note 3; File & Prince, supra note 28; Gulati & Gargiulo, supra note 59; 
Ellis & Watterson, supra note 82.  
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Over the years, academic scholars have attempted to explain the components 
that make up a firm’s reputation.  Uzzi et al. proposed that organizations with 
positive reputations charged more for their services and had greater name 
recognition.138  They also placed higher in rankings of the top law firms.139  
Deephouse held that expertise, popular esteem, and institutional knowledge were 
determinants of a good reputation.140  To varying degrees, the nine respondents 
verified these past definitions of reputation.  All confirmed that knowledge and 
expertise primarily accounted for a law firm’s reputation.  Popular esteem, 
competence, and integrity were also attributed to these organizations. 
Clow et al. and Hughes and Kasulis demonstrated that firm reputation was 
correlated to the purchasing decisions made by consumers.141  Seven interview 
subjects acknowledged considering law firm reputation when choosing external 
counsel, but a majority of these respondents claimed that it was not the most 
important criterion.  The profiled investment banks typically maintained 
relationships with law firms with high reputations: all utilized the services of 
White Shoe or Magic Circle firms in the past, and three claimed that they had 
strong ties to these elite firms.   
3. All I Want is a Little Conversation: Social Networks and Buying 
Decisions 
Studies by File and Prince, File et al., and Uzzi et al. concentrated on the role 
of social networks in procurement choices.142  These researchers asserted that 
corporate decision-makers turned to their social networks for recommendations or 
referrals of external providers.  The nine profiled investment banks relied 
extensively on the suggestions of colleagues, attorneys, and professional 
organizations for insight on external law firms.  All of the interviewees highly 
regarded the opinions and recommendations of colleagues, especially those of 
individuals with whom they shared a close relationship.   
Ellis and Watterson discussed WOM output referrals, citing expertise and 
approachability as reasons one firm would recommend an external provider to 
another organization.143  However, seven of the profiled investment banks 
expressed reservations about sharing a negative opinion of a specific law firm with 
another bank.  These results were especially surprising because of the worth these 
same interview subjects placed in the referrals of others.  It seems that within the 
referral dynamic, the respondents valued a colleague’s assessment of an external 
provider, but they were unwilling to contribute their negative perceptions of a law 
firm for the benefit of colleagues.  Therefore, the extent to which corporate 
decision-makers should rely upon the referrals of colleagues deserves further 
scrutiny.   
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4. Torn Between Scylla and Charybdis: Lawyers, Law Firms, and 
Client Loyalty 
Individuals empowered to choose external legal services for investment 
banks were attracted to both law firms and the individual lawyers in their employ.  
Seven respondents explicitly stated that the individual attorneys working on behalf 
of their respective bank were more important than the law firms they worked for, 
while two interview subjects expressed a preference for the law firms.   
Despite the fact that a majority of interviewees believed that specific lawyers 
were more important than specific law firms as criteria for selection, the 
respondents always discussed their relationship with the firm rather than the 
individual.  Only three investment banks would transfer business to a new firm to 
continue using a lawyer who was switching employment.  The remaining six 
investment banks either would refuse to follow a departing attorney, or they would 
follow him to a new firm only under certain circumstances.  Thus, while general 
counsel may believe that the lawyers working on a case are more important than 
the firm that employs them, investment banks foster relationships with law firms, 
not attorneys.  The data suggest that maintaining strong relations with specific law 
firms is of more concern to investment banks than the services of any single 
lawyer.   
5. A Question of Choice: Selection, Retention, and Defection 
Academic theorists have generally focused their studies of procurement 
decisions on either the initial choices of external firms or on subsequent selection.  
This previous research has identified different sets characteristics that decision-
makers consider depending on whether a nascent or subsequent choice is being 
made.   
Greenwood et al. discussed the impact of information asymmetry on nascent-
selection decisions.144  He and his colleagues claimed that corporate decision-
makers are likely to hold intangible assessment criteria in high regard because they 
lack tangible evaluative information.  Fombrun and Shanley identified firm 
reputation as a major consideration for individuals selecting external services for 
the first time, and Uzzi et al. justified their results, asserting that corporate 
decision-makers could more easily explain a selection choice to superiors if the 
chosen firm had a positive reputation.145  WOM referrals from trusted colleagues 
also factored into corporate selection choices during nascent selection, as did the 
positive portrayal of a firm through the media.146 
Academic literature emphasizing subsequent selection was primarily 
concerned with the factors influencing an organization’s continued retention of (or 
defection from) an external provider.  Previous experiences with a firm under-
shadowed all of these decisions.  Studies by Palmer and Carlton, respectively, 
explored the qualities of long-term business relationships, and Levinthal and 
                                                          
144 See Greenwood et al., supra note 1. 
145 See Fombrun & Shanley, supra note 6, at 252; Uzzi et al., supra note 3. 
146 See, e.g., File et al., supra note 29; Uzzi et al., supra note 3; Pollock & Rindova, supra note 35. 
SHEHU_COMPLETE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:07 PM 
416 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. IV:II 
 
Fichman proposed mutual trust and inertia as two reasons these relationships 
exist.147  Uzzi added embeddedness to this list.148  Close, time-tested relationships 
allowed the client to receive more specialized service, as well as price discounts.149  
Interestingly, price and dissatisfaction were the main reasons for a client’s 
defection to a rival firm.150   
In both nascent and subsequent selection, the nine profiled investment banks 
cited expertise as the most important criterion in external law firm retention.  
However, while subsequent selection afforded corporate decision-makers the 
benefit of past experience to form an opinion about a firm’s expertise, internal 
counsel were forced to rely on more intangible factors during nascent selection.  
Confirming the results of past studies, the nine investment banks turned to their 
social networks for recommendations when devoid of personal knowledge about a 
firm.  Cost was a major consideration during both the nascent and subsequent 
selection processes.  When comparing two law firms that were both highly 
recommended, corporate decision-makers went with the less-expensive alternative.  
The majority of the profiled investment banks had unique billing arrangements 
with one or more law firms.  Overall, this fact influenced subsequent selection 
choices.  Most of the interview subjects agreed that reputation was one criterion in 
their decisions, but it was not the most important choice factor.  All of the 
investment banks maintained relations with White Shoe or Magic Circle firms, and 
the impact of firm reputation on retention decisions is worthy of future study. 
VI. REFLECTIONS AND COMMENTS 
In seeking to determine the methods investment banks use to retain external 
legal counsel, this project relied upon original research taking the form of semi-
structured interviews.  Representatives from nine investment banks in Europe and 
the United States supplied data, which was then presented in the context of existing 
academic literature.  This section will analyze the gathered data, exploring its 
relevant trends and noting its broader implications for the legal and banking 
communities.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
147 See PALMER, supra note 54; Carlton, supra note 55; Levinthal & Fichman, supra note 56.   
148 See Uzzi, supra note 60.  
149 See Uzzi et al., supra note 3. 
150 See Palihawadana & Barnes, supra note 7, at 111. 
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A. Assumptions 
Man’s attempt to understand the world around him is limited by 
ontological,151 epistemological,152 and methodological153 assumptions, as well as 
assumptions related to human nature. Each set of assumptions, in turn, can be 
divided into two distinct camps according to the subjectivist-objectivist 
dichotomy.154  Broadly defined, subjectivism holds that individuals shape the 
world around them, whereas objectivism charges that individuals are shaped by the 
world.  This article assumes that man is an actor in the world around him, not a 
constructor of it.  Furthermore, all acquired knowledge is assumed to contain a 
degree of bias.   
Assumptions related to human nature are those that concern man’s 
interaction with his environment.155  For the purposes of this paper, the term 
“manager” is used to describe a person within an investment bank who is 
empowered to select external legal counsel.  Likewise, “environment” is defined as 
either the community of investment banks or an individual investment bank.   
At both the macro and micro levels, human nature assumptions fall within 
four distinct viewpoints: system-structural, natural selection, collective action, and 
strategic choice.156  The natural selection viewpoint, at a macro level, asserts that 
                                                          
151 Finding its roots in the ancient philosophical science of metaphysics, ontology explores the 
nature of being, and it can be subdivided into nominalism and realism.  GIBSON BURRELL & GARETH 
MORGAN, SOCIOLOGICAL PARADIGMS AND ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS: ELEMENTS OF THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF CORPORATE LIFE (1979) (providing a thorough analysis of sociological paradigms).  A 
nominalist (subjectivist approach) believes that reality is an internal construct of the mind.  Id.  In 
contrast, a realist (objectivist approach) holds that reality is concrete and tangible, and social structures 
exist outside of the mind.  Id. 
152 Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with human knowledge.  Id.  It is subdivided 
into the positivist (objective) and anti-positivist (subjective) approaches.  Id.  For a positivist, 
knowledge can only be ascertained through the scientific method; hence, the only real knowledge is 
scientific in nature.  Id.  An anti-positivist, on the other hand, sees knowledge as a relative concept.  
BURRELL & MORGAN, supra note 151.  It is not possible for man to separate himself from the world 
around him to gain “true” knowledge in a positivist sense.  Id. 
153 Gareth Morgan & Linda Smircich, The Case for Qualitative Research, 5 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
491 (1980) (exploring different areas of the objective-subjective continuum, applying a research design 
for each theoretical perspective).  The authors stressed the advantages of qualitative methods, pointing 
out that quantitative designs assume that human behavior is standardized, that all people react in the 
same manner to similar phenomena.   
If one recognizes that the social world constitutes some form of open-ended 
process, any method that closes the subject of study within the confines of a 
laboratory, or merely contents itself with the production of narrow empirical 
snapshots of isolated phenomena at fixed points in time, does not do complete 
justice to the nature of the subject.   
Id. at 498.  In sum, as soon as a person acknowledges that human interaction and behavior does 
not occur in a vacuum, he must discount the superiority of pure quantitative methods.  I arrived at this 
conclusion fairly easily in light of the fact that my personal outlook toward the world is at the center of 
the objective-subjective continuum.  Like Morgan and Smircich, I cannot dismiss quantitative methods 
as irrelevant; rather, I believe that they can be useful, particularly to a project similar to my own.  
Nevertheless, due to time constraints, I have been forced to limit my research analysis to qualitative 
methods. 
154 See BURRELL & MORGAN, supra note 151. 
155 See id. 
156 See W. Graham Astley & Andrew H. Van-de-Ven, Central Perspectives and Debates in 
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“the evolution of corporate society and its economic infrastructure is driven by 
environmental forces.”157  Hence, a manager merely adheres to industry standards 
when choosing legal services, seldom relying on any personal preference he may 
have.158  The collective-action viewpoint is focused on “networks of symbiotically 
interdependent, yet semiautonomous organizations that interact to construct or 
modify their collective environment, working rules, and options.”159  A manager, 
when entrusted with the task of selecting a law firm, would consult with his social 
network of peers.  Perhaps he would consult with colleagues at another investment 
bank, inquiring which law firms or attorneys they have been most satisfied with.  
Based on this information, a manager would then make an independent decision of 
which firm to retain.  At the micro level centered on an individual organization, a 
manager has considerable personal choice to select a law firm according to the 
strategic choice viewpoint.  In essence, this perspective sees reputation as a 
byproduct of individual managers’ choices, not as a determinant of them.160   
Regarding assumptions of human nature, this article takes the position that 
both the voluntarist and determinist perspectives have merit in particular situations.  
For this reason, this article attempts to take an unbiased approach to human nature 
by examining managerial behavior, determining a manager’s degree of autonomy 
in decision-making counterbalanced by the role of environmental factors on his 
eventual choice.  
B. Trends 
1. Risky Business 
Corporate counsel in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Russia 
identified “transfer of risk” as a major reason for retaining an outside law firm.  In 
contrast, none of their colleagues in the United States suggested that risk 
management had anything to do with their choices of attorneys.  These results are 
initially striking—how could it be that in-house lawyers practicing in the litigation 
                                                          
Organization Theory, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 245, 250 (1983).  Of the four views presented, the system-
structural view is not applicable to my project because it is focused “not on choice but on gathering 
correct information about environmental variations and on using technical criteria.”  Id. at 248.  
157 Id. at 250.   This notion can be understood through the concept of industrial structure, the idea 
that competition within an industry occurs within stable economic parameters.  See, e.g., Michael E. 
Porter, The Contributions of Industrial Organization to Strategic Management, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
609, 641 (1981).   
158 Economic and transaction cost concerns may also motivate a decision.  See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 62.  For example, if law firms typically offer discount rates to frequent clients, a manager 
has an incentive to continuously retain the same firm.  Uzzi et al., supra note 3.  Thus, a desire to 
maximize profits is at the root of his decision.  The natural selection viewpoint is deterministic 
(objectivist approach) in its outlook-- that is, it assumes that exterior events or conditions force a 
manager to make a certain choice.  BURRELL & MORGAN, supra note 151.  This idea contrasts with 
voluntarism (subjectivist approach) which holds that a manager’s individual will is the primary factor in 
his decision.  Id.   
159 Astley & Van-de-Ven, supra note 156, at 251. 
160 An individual is constrained by neither industry standards nor interdependent relationships.  Id.  
Law firms chosen more often by managers (based on individual, personal reasons) would presumably 
have a better reputation. 
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capital of the world are less concerned with transaction risks than their European 
counterparts?  Viewing these results through the purview of human nature proves 
edifying.   
In the United States, “conversations between a corporation’s employees and 
in-house counsel are protected by [attorney-client] privilege.”161  Likewise, 
German lawyers who are advising an employer on a legal matter may refuse to turn 
over internal conversations as evidence,162 and practitioners in Japan, by virtue of 
their duty of confidentiality to clients, may refuse to testify about internal 
conversations.163  Though the basis for the United States’ attorney-client privilege 
evolved from British common law, the United Kingdom’s continued adherence to 
the concept is debatable in the context of corporate counsel.  A 1982 decision of 
the European Court of Justice held that attorney-client privilege applies only to 
communications between an organization and external counsel.164  Likewise, 
Swiss and Russian courts do not exclude communications with internal counsel 
from evidence.165 
Though correlation does not imply causation, it seems plausible that 
European internal counsel may be engaging in creative lawyering.  Investment 
banks place a premium on secrecy during early discussions of mergers and 
leveraged buyouts.  In an effort to protect confidential company information, 
corporate counsel in Europe may mitigate risk by channeling private, internal 
communications through external law firms, thereby cloaking such 
communications with attorney-client privilege. 
2. Culture Club 
Rhine Capital, Swiss Financial, and Britannia Bank Corporation 
characterized their relationships with Magic Circle and White Shoe firms as “very 
strong.”166  Business culture in Germany and Switzerland, the homes of Rhine 
Capital and Swiss Financial, respectively, is noted for the value it places on 
specialized skills and formal education.167  Magic Circle and White Shoe attorneys 
typically are hired from the top law schools. 168  Could it be that German and 
Swiss PSFs use similar evaluative criteria when selecting external law firms and 
                                                          
161 Edna S. Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, A.B.A. SEC. 
LITIG. 205 (2007). 
162 See Michael Molitoris, Germany, In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege, LEX 
MUNDI PUBLICATION 1 (2009).  
163 See Alvin Hiromasa Shionzaki, Japan, In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 
LEX MUNDI PUBLICATION 1 (2009).  
164 See AM&S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., Case 155/79, 1982 E.C.R. 1575.  
165 See Robert Furter & Michael Kramer, Switzerland, In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, LEX MUNDI PUBLICATION 134 (2009); Erin E. Arvedlund, Critics Say a Jailed Yukos Lawyer 
is a “Hostage,” N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/29/business/ 
worldbusiness/29yukos.html. 
166 See supra Part V.C.4. 
167 See World Business Culture, Doing Business in Switzerland, http://www.worldbusinessculture. 
com/Business-in-Switzerland.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2011). 
168 DAVID CALLAHAN, THE CHEATING CULTURE: WHY MORE AMERICANS ARE DOING WRONG TO 
GET AHEAD 213 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2004); Maitland Edey, Behind the Scenes Tour of 
Lawyers Who Try, LIFE, Mar. 9, 1962. 
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hiring employees?  Further emphasizing the importance of reputation in Germany 
and Switzerland, Rhine Capital and Swiss Financial would only follow an attorney 
to another firm if the new firm had the same level of prestige. 
Britannia Bank Corporation seems to undermine the suggestions of the 
preceding paragraph.  First, Britannia is based in the United Kingdom, where 
corporate culture dictates a less hierarchical, more collegial relationship among 
employees and superiors.169  Mr. McGraw’s interview responses suggest that his 
legal department has its proverbial bases covered.170  It has a strong relationship 
with the elite law firms on its panel.  Britannia Bank Corporation has cultivated 
these relationships over a long period of time, and it is generally satisfied with the 
service provided by the firms on the panel.  Hence, Mr. McGraw and his legal 
department have no reason to look elsewhere.  Britannia Bank Corporation, for 
these reasons, may be a cultural outlier.  
Among the other investment banks profiled, those based in the United States 
seem to be highly influenced by cultural norms.  The work environment in the 
United States’ banks is rigidly individualistic.171  Those employees who are 
producers are promoted, while the consumers are forced out of the organization.  
Individual responsibility is evident in the gathered data.  Keystone Investors and 
Hamilton Grey are the only two firms profiled that entrusted their procurement 
specialists with full autonomy when choosing external counsel.  All three U.S. 
firms valued personal service and relied upon some form of beauty parading during 
the selection process.172  For U.S. banks, the message sent to law firms during the 
panel selection process was “show me the money”—demonstrate to us why we 
should retain your services.  
3. Size Does Matter 
The data suggest that an investment bank’s size173 may be predictive of the 
external law firms it will choose.  In terms of selection methods, the three largest 
firms relied on panels.174  Larger firms also valued personal service less than banks 
smaller in size.   
In the context of size, the strength of relationship between investment banks 
and elite law firms warrants further discussion.  Rhine Bank, Swiss Financial, and 
Britannia Bank Corporation, the three largest firms, had very strong relationships 
with Magic Circle and White Shoe firms.  At the other end of the size spectrum, 
the four smallest investment banks had used elite law firms in the past.  Frankfurt 
Securities and Nippon International, two “midsized” banks, had never used White 
Shoe or Magic Circle firms.  Why would midsized firms avoid the world’s elite 
law firms? 
                                                          
169 See World Business Culture, Doing Business in Britain, http://www.worldbusinessculture.com/ 
Business-in-Britain.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2011). 
170 See supra Part V. 
171 See World Business Culture, Doing Business in USA, http://www.worldbusinessculture.com/ 
Business-in-The-USA.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2011). 
172 See supra Part V.C.5-6. 
173 Size is measured by the number of employees working at a particular investment bank. 
174 See supra Part V.B. 
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As this article has previously alluded, elite law firms charge more per hour 
than their less-prestigious counterparts.  Similarly, larger investment banks have 
more influence over the market, and therefore, they tend to generate greater 
revenue.  It might be fair to conclude that larger investment banks have strong 
relationships with elite law firms because they can afford the legal fees.  But how 
does this conclusion explain the fact that smaller investment banks were more 
likely to use a White Shoe or Magic Circle firm than midsized firms?  In an effort 
to attract clients higher in profile, perhaps smaller investment banks capitalize on 
the reputations of older, highly regarded law firms. 
C. Broader Implications 
1. Investment Banks: Let the Good Times Roll 
Investment banks should be poised to take advantage of changes occurring 
within the legal industry.  The Great Recession has resulted in a saturated legal 
market and an eagerness among elite law firms to compete for business.175  For 
internal counsel at the world’s top investment banks, declining profits in the legal 
industry should herald the coming of less expensive legal services, greater 
discounts, and more flexible billing schemes.   
Corporate counsel can benefit from the saturated legal market in three ways.  
First and most obviously, since the data reveal that top law firms offer discounts 
and investment banks possess buying power, internal counsel can coerce White 
Shoe and Magic Circle firms to provide the same service at a lower price.  Second, 
having to overcome greater competition for clients from Magic Circle firms, Silver 
Circle firms will likely charge even less for legal services.  If, as Mr. Lemon and 
Mr. Martin have asserted, the best lawyers are found in the Silver Circle, 
investment banks can enjoy a superior work product from those firms, at a 
significantly discounted rate.  Finally, the ever-expanding pool of unemployed 
lawyers may allow banks to minimize legal costs by hiring more internal lawyers 
for lower salaries. 
2. Law Firms: Let’s Face the Music and Dance 
As competition for clients intensifies in the legal industry, law firms stand to 
benefit from closely scrutinizing the gathered data.  Getting placed on a panel is 
crucial for law firms seeking investment banks as clients.  Transaction costs like 
board approval and an orientation period176 raise high barriers to entry for new 
firms desiring panel selection.  In order to maximize the odds of panel selection, 
law firms must differentiate themselves from competing firms. 
Law firms can distinguish themselves from their competitors by increasing 
the services they offer to clients, hiring attorneys who are experts in their 
                                                          
175 See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?_r=2&emc=eta1.  
176 In this context, “orientation period” refers to the length of time it takes for a new law firm to 
acclimatize to a bank’s internal procedures and processes.  
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respective fields of practice, and adding value to their clients’ organizations.  In 
essence, investment banks want to have their cake and eat it too—legal 
departments place a premium on full service law firms, those with both 
transactional and litigation practice groups.  At the same time, internal counsel 
look upon generalists with disdain and derision.  The attorneys working on behalf 
of the bank must be experts in the matter on which they are counseling.   
Law firms can add value to an investment bank by lowering the cost of legal 
services or by delivering a superior result.  While investment banks employing a 
revenue generation strategy may prefer the traditional billable hour, investment 
banks focused on cost control may be partial to law firms with flat rate billing.  By 
presenting potential clients with different billing options, law firms give 
investment banks a degree of control over costs and results, and perhaps more 
importantly, send the message that they understand the unique needs of a particular 
investment bank.  
Because internal counsel feel more secure working with external lawyers 
they have previously retained, it is important for panel attorneys to maintain a 
positive relationship with the general counsel or procurement specialist.  Such a 
strong relationship may not be enough to earn panel selection for a particular law 
firm, but it may contribute to greater amounts of future work for one panel firm 
over another.  Also, since all respondents emphasized the importance of a WOM 
referral from a trusted colleague, a lawyer’s positive relationship with corporate 
counsel from one bank could lead to retention of his firm by another bank. 
Finally, law firms need to be able to prove product superiority.  Two-thirds 
of the profiled investment banks conducted beauty parades.  One-third of the banks 
provided a newly retained law firm with pilot work.  Though traditionally shunned 
by the legal community, law firm marketing is becoming ever more imperative as 
the industry rebounds from the Great Recession.   
This article has spent considerable time exploring the importance of law firm 
reputation.  Examining the data in the context of present economic events, it seems 
that the elite law firms of tomorrow will not be those with a sterling history or 
gold-plated letterhead; instead, tomorrow’s most sought after firms will be those 
with the ability to sell themselves, those that can most succinctly connect the law 
firm’s institutional capital to the client’s individualized needs. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A. Sources of Error 
Data gathering for this article occurred at a tumultuous time in the banking 
industry.  The bursting of the housing bubble in the United States led to high 
default rates on subprime mortgages and triggered a financial crisis felt by 
investment banks around the world.  Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, 
and Lehman Brothers required government bailouts, and hundreds of other banks 
suffered significant losses.  For these reasons, arranging interviews with banking 
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officials proved extremely challenging.177 
I was also forced to conduct most interviews via telephone.  Academics have 
pointed out that “in phone interviews, all sorts of conversational cues are missing, 
making for difficult interviewing under the best of circumstances.”178  While I 
recognize the barriers that a telephone can erect in terms of gauging emotion and 
body language, I do not believe that the telephone interviews I conducted 
adversely affected my data.  My goal during the interview stage was to gather 
facts, and the questions I asked were neither emotionally stirring nor upsetting to 
the respondents.   
Data analysis also presented some difficulties.  All of the obtained results 
were self-reported.  The decision-makers I interviewed could have skewed their 
answers or withheld useful information.  My script of prewritten questions 
invariably infused personal bias into the results, and my construction of questions, 
as well as their tone, may have elicited tainted responses.  Ultimately, I had to 
interpret the interview responses by amalgamating the information gathered into a 
narrative, a single explanation of the results.179  This process again introduced 
personal bias into the equation. 
B. Suggestions for Further Research 
While this article has offered some compelling insight into how investment 
banks select external legal services, its small sample size necessitates further 
testing.  These results could be used to construct survey questions which could be 
distributed to a wider sampling of global investment banks.  A survey would 
provide for a quantitative analysis of the results, isolating the extent to which 
geographical location, bank size, and culture influence the criteria considered by 
decision-makers, thereby testing the queries raised in Section VI of this article.  
Three of my interview subjects claimed that firm reputation was merely a 
byproduct of their social networks.  The effect of social networks on the 
construction of firm reputations should be explored.  Finally, more information is 
necessary on PSF loyalty to attorneys switching from one firm to another. 
                                                          
177 Only a small percent of investment banks responded to my request for an interview.  Hence, I 
obtained the best possible sample under the circumstances, but the low response rate made quantitative 
analysis impossible.  Conducting a project of this nature in a nine month timeframe drastically 
constricted the data-collection process.  
178 RUBIN & RUBIN, supra note 86, at 141.  
179 See id. at 31. 
